After 25 years as a Milwaukee police officer, I learned that credibility is among the most valuable things an officer possesses. A badge gives an officer legal authority, but credibility gives that authority legitimacy. Without it, even the strongest criminal investigation can fall apart. An officer who knowingly falsifies a report, fabricates evidence, or lies under oath betrays the public trust. Such conduct can destroy prosecutions, jeopardize an innocent person’s freedom, and damage the reputations of honest officers. There should be no disagreement about that.
But another principle deserves equal consideration. An allegation of dishonesty is not necessarily proof of dishonesty, and not every officer identified on a prosecutor’s Brady list belongs in the same category. Investigations into Milwaukee County’s credibility records have exposed problems with how information is collected, maintained, and disclosed. Those findings raise important questions about defendants’ rights, police accountability, and fairness to individual officers.
Can government protect the public from dishonest testimony without treating every allegation as a guilty verdict? It must. And it should.
The Constitutional Origins of Brady Lists
In Brady v. Maryland (1963), the United States Supreme Court established that prosecutors violate due process when they suppress material evidence favorable to a criminal defendant. In Giglio v. United States (1972), the Court addressed evidence undermining the credibility of government witnesses. In Kyles v. Whitley (1995), it reinforced prosecutors’ responsibility to learn of favorable evidence known to law enforcement officers working on their cases.
Together, these decisions established essential protections against unfair prosecutions. They did not, however, establish a nationwide system for labeling police officers dishonest. Prosecutors developed administrative records commonly called Brady lists or Giglio lists to identify officers whose backgrounds might contain information requiring disclosure.
These records serve an important purpose. Prosecutors must know when an officer’s credibility could become an issue in court, and defendants must receive the information the Constitution requires. But an administrative designation is not necessarily a finding of misconduct, a disciplinary decision, or a final judgment about someone’s fitness to serve. That distinction is frequently lost in public discussion.
Milwaukee’s Brady List Reveals a Larger Problem
A March 2025 investigation by the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Wisconsin Watch, and TMJ4 examined Milwaukee County’s Brady records and identified incomplete and inconsistent information, including inaccuracies concerning officers’ backgrounds and reasons for inclusion. The reporting also found that Wisconsin lacked uniform statewide standards for maintaining these records, leaving individual district attorneys largely responsible for their own practices.
Reporters requested written Brady-related policies from 23 Milwaukee County law enforcement agencies. Seven provided policies, nine reported having none, including the Milwaukee Police Department, and seven did not provide one. That matters because prosecutors depend partly on police departments to report potential credibility concerns. When relevant information is not communicated, defendants may be denied evidence they are legally entitled to receive.
But inaccurate records create another problem. An officer’s entry may contain outdated, disputed, or unexplained information that leads the public to conclusions the evidence does not support. Both failures undermine confidence in the system.
Follow-up reporting in March 2026 found that, as of September 2025, Milwaukee County’s records contained 217 entries involving 190 individual officers. The district attorney’s office continued using criteria involving pending criminal charges, past convictions, and internal investigations raising integrity concerns. Defense attorneys questioned whether those criteria adequately captured judicial findings questioning officers’ credibility.
Subsequent reporting documented improvements in the accuracy of Milwaukee County’s records, but those improvements do not eliminate the broader need for consistent standards, transparency, and fair procedures.
That criticism deserves serious consideration. Constitutionally required disclosure cannot depend solely on whether an incident fits an administrative category. Yet appearing in that database should not automatically establish intentional wrongdoing. An effective system must be comprehensive enough to protect defendants and accurate enough to avoid misleading conclusions about officers.
Not Every Credibility Concern Is the Same
Consider three situations. One officer deliberately falsifies evidence to obtain a conviction. Another faces a disputed allegation of making an inaccurate statement during an internal investigation. A third has an old criminal conviction unrelated to police duties that nevertheless raises legitimate credibility questions.
Each situation may require prosecutorial attention. Depending on the facts, each may produce information that must be disclosed. But they are not equivalent. A mistaken recollection is not necessarily an intentional lie. An accusation is not proof of misconduct. And a decades-old incident may warrant different consideration from deliberate dishonesty in a current investigation.
That does not mean older misconduct should be ignored. Dishonesty outside police work may legitimately affect credibility in court. The point is that evidence, context, and seriousness matter. The public should expect complete constitutional disclosure without assuming that every name on a list represents the same conduct.
What the Wisconsin Supreme Court Actually Said
Milwaukee’s history illustrates why these distinctions matter. In Andrade v. City of Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, 2024 WI 17, decided April 30, 2024, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed former Milwaukee Police Officer Erik Andrade’s challenge to his termination following controversial Facebook posts. The case involved departmental policy violations and concerns about whether Andrade could continue serving as a prosecution witness.
In paragraph 17, the court described testimony from Kent Lovern, then a senior Milwaukee County prosecutor and now the Milwaukee County District Attorney, concerning three categories of officers: those prosecutors would never call to testify; those prosecutors would call with qualifications; and those prosecutors would call while disclosing relevant credibility information. Andrade was placed in the most restrictive category.
These classifications demonstrate that prosecutors recognized different degrees of concern and different consequences. Not every officer presenting a credibility issue was automatically considered unsuitable to testify.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld Andrade’s termination in a 5–2 decision. The constitutional question before the court concerned whether the procedures surrounding that termination satisfied due-process requirements. Importantly, two justices dissented. They argued that Andrade had not received adequate notice of the reason that ultimately drove his termination: the prosecutor’s determination that he could no longer serve as a witness. The majority disagreed and concluded that the applicable constitutional requirements had been satisfied.
That disagreement matters. Even judges reviewing the same record can reach different conclusions about whether government provided adequate procedural protections. The ruling does not establish that Andrade was innocent of misconduct or that his termination was unlawful. Nor does it settle every broader question concerning fairness or proportionality.
Its relevance here is that credibility classifications can carry different consequences, sometimes affecting an officer’s entire career. These classifications were documented in that case and should not automatically be assumed to describe every aspect of Milwaukee County’s current procedures.
When an Officer Can Patrol but Cannot Testify
A Brady designation does not automatically prohibit an officer from testifying or require a police department to terminate that officer. Some officers remain employed, investigate crimes, prepare reports, and testify with appropriate disclosures. Others face restrictions, reassignment, discipline, or dismissal.
This creates difficult questions. If prosecutors determine that an officer cannot reliably testify, how does that affect the officer’s ability to perform essential police duties? Conversely, if an officer can continue performing those duties and testify with proper disclosure, should that officer suffer the same reputational consequences as someone proven to have fabricated evidence?
There cannot be one automatic answer. Police departments must consider the underlying conduct, available evidence, job responsibilities, and public confidence. Prosecutors must independently fulfill their constitutional obligations. Neither institution should substitute an administrative label for individualized judgment.
Protecting Defendants Requires Accurate Records
The strongest objection to concerns about fairness for officers is straightforward: What happens when prosecutors fail to identify or disclose damaging credibility information? The consequences can be devastating. An innocent person may be convicted because the defense never learns that a government witness has a history relevant to the witness’s reliability. That is precisely why Brady protections exist.
Milwaukee’s reporting identified concerns about gaps in tracking credibility information, including how judicial findings questioning officers’ credibility were handled. An effective system must capture potentially relevant information even without a criminal conviction or sustained internal disciplinary finding.
But accuracy matters, too. If records contain errors, agencies should correct them. Disputed allegations should be identified accurately. When new evidence changes an assessment, procedures should permit reconsideration.
None of these safeguards should delay constitutionally required disclosures. Defendants cannot be required to wait while an officer challenges an administrative designation. Prosecutors must disclose what the law requires regardless of whether an officer disputes the underlying allegation. These obligations can coexist.
Fairness Must Apply to Government Power in Every Direction
Government possesses extraordinary authority over people’s lives. Police officers exercise powers of arrest, search, and detention under circumstances authorized by law. Prosecutors initiate proceedings that may ultimately deprive individuals of their freedom. Those powers demand accountability.
Government also exercises considerable authority over the careers and reputations of its employees. A credibility determination can affect an officer’s assignments, advancement, courtroom responsibilities, and continued employment. Officers do not deserve immunity from scrutiny. But decisions carrying serious consequences should rest on reliable evidence and fair procedures.
Wisconsin would benefit from consistent standards for identifying potential Brady information, maintaining accurate records, documenting disputed allegations, and reviewing entries when circumstances change. Officers should have meaningful opportunities to identify errors and present relevant information when appropriate.
Prosecutors must retain independent authority over disclosure decisions, and defense attorneys must continue receiving every disclosure required by law. A carefully maintained record serves everyone better than a database that simply accumulates names.
Accountability Should Never Become Collective Guilt
Public debates about policing frequently reduce complicated circumstances to simple labels. An officer appears on a list, and people may assume something serious occurred. Sometimes that assumption is justified. An officer who deliberately lies under oath, fabricates evidence, or conceals misconduct damages the integrity of the profession and should face consequences appropriate to the proven conduct.
But disputed allegations should not automatically be treated as established wrongdoing. Responsible accountability requires examining what happened, what evidence supports the allegation, whether the conduct was intentional, and what consequences are justified. Those questions protect the public from dishonest officers while protecting honest officers from unsupported conclusions.
There is no contradiction in demanding full disclosure for criminal defendants while insisting that allegations against police officers be evaluated accurately. Both principles reject the same dangerous idea: that government should impose serious consequences without careful attention to evidence.
Justice Requires More Than a List
Defendants must continue to receive every disclosure the Constitution requires. At the same time, the public deserves enough context to distinguish between proven perjury, disputed allegations, and conduct unrelated to police duties.
This is about restraining government power in both directions. If prosecutors can demand disclosure to protect liberty, they should also apply clear standards and fair procedures when people’s livelihoods are at stake. That means accurate records, meaningful opportunities to respond, and periodic review, without delaying or limiting what defendants must receive.
A system designed to protect the innocent should not presume guilt by association, whether the person is a defendant or a police witness. Accountability demands truthful policing, full disclosure, and honest testimony. It also requires careful judgment about evidence and seriousness, not slogans.
Justice is not served when government protects one person’s rights by disregarding another’s. The standard must be the same for everyone: evidence before judgment, fairness before punishment, and accountability without exception.
